時 間：2019-12-17 14:00
Did corporate loan securitization through collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) change the nature of bank lending relationship? Using a large sample of corporate loans held by CLOs, we show a complex impact on bank relationship. When a borrower’s prior loan from a lender is securitized, its subsequent revolvers granted by the same lender carry higher credit spreads and looser covenants than revolvers granted by a non-securitization-funded relationship lender. Despite the higher costs, the securitization-funded relationship lender is able to keep the borrower for future lending business. This is because the lender grants larger amount of institutional term loans at lower spreads. These contractual features associated with securitization imply a “relationship impairment” effect that securitization weakens monitoring incentives and reduces the information advantage of relationship banks in providing revolvers. In providing institutional term loans, these lenders enjoy a “credit improvement” effect due to their access to structured credit market and hence are able to keep these borrowers for repeated lending business. Overall, our findings indicate that benefits of securitization coexist with its costs in relationship lending.
Dr. Xin Liu joined RSFAS as a lecturer (assistant professor) in finance in July 2014. Her research interests are in banking, information economics, corporate finance and China research. Dr. Xin Liu earned her PhD in Finance from the National University of Singapore. She also obtained master’s degrees in Applied Economics and Physics from University of Minnesota, and a bachelor degree in physics from University of Science and Technology of China (USTC). Prior to her current appointment at the Australian National University, she has worked as an investment professional at the Temasek Holdings in Singapore and also visited the Chazen Institute of International Business at the Columbia University.
※ 聯系方式：中國交易合夥商行人民大學商學院宣傳信息事務辦公室 郵箱：email@example.com